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This paper provides an overview of the security architecture for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) 
designed by the INDECT project, and in particular the security infrastructures that have been deployed so 
far. These security infrastructures can be organized in the following main areas: Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) and user management, communications security, and new cryptographic algorithms. 
This paper presents the new ideas, architectures and deployed testbeds for these areas. In particular, it 
explains the inner structure of the INDECT PKI employed for federated identity management, the different 
technologies employed in the VPN testbed, the INDECT Block Cipher (IBC) – a novel cryptographic 
algorithm that has being integrated into OpenSSL library, and how IBC-enabled TLS/SSL sessions and 
X.509 certificates are employed to protect INDECT applications. All proposed mechanisms have been 
designed to work in an integrated fashion as the security foundation of all systems being developed by the 
INDECT project for LEAs.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays the requirements of any ICT (Information and Communication Technologies)
system regarding data protection and information security are constantly increasing. The
expectations of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) from their ICT systems are even higher,
given that the security of their citizens is at stake. INDECT (Intelligent information system
supporting observation, searching and detection for security of citizens in urban environ-
ment) [5] is a collaborative research project funded by the 7th EU Framework Program
whose objective is to develop advanced tools for Law Enforcement Agencies. In particular
the Work Package 8 (WP8) of the INDECT project is focused on increasing the security of
the information stored, exchanged or accessed by INDECT systems and users.
One of the main characteristics of today’s ICT is system interconnection. Based on different
protocols and standards, LEA systems exchange a lot of information related to users, citizens,
suspects, criminals, system status, patrol vehicles, etc. All these data are sent and received in different
ways and stored in dedicated systems. This huge amount of information raises two main problems:
the management of the so-called “big data”, and the security of this information. For assuring
confidentiality, integrity, accessibility, access control and non-repudiation it is necessary to employ
different methods and techniques - from technical to organizational ones. For a complex ecosystem
the first step to create a secure environment is to define the security foundations of such a system.
2 INDECT security architecture
Figure 1 shows a simplified view of the integrated security architecture for Law Enforce-
ment Agencies being designed by the INDECT project.
The main components [11] of the proposed security architecture are:
& Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)—to issue, mange, store and revoke X.509 certificates
used in the system. They are issued to all users and ICT systems to authenticate them as
well as to secure their communications.
& LDAPUser Directory—to store all users’ contact data and credentials for legacy systems that
do not support certificate-based authentication. The user directory also stores general autho-
rization information, such as the user’s clearance level or the applications she can access to.
& Audit Server—all relevant user actions (e.g. accessing an application or requesting
classified information) is logged both locally and in the secure centralized system. The
logs are constantly being reviewed by LEA auditors to detect suspicious behaviors.
& INDECT Portal—the homepage of LEA users. It allows them to access the different services
and applications available to them, according to particular scenarios (e.g. during a crisis). The
INDECT portal also acts as the Identity Provider (IdP) for all INDECT federated systems.
& INDECT Application Servers—execute the different applications, services and tools being
developed by the INDECT project. They act as Federated Service Providers (SP), authenti-
cating the users through the INDECT Portal (IdP), although they may handle application-
specific user’s authorization attributes (e.g. which CCTV cameras a given user may access
to). Most applications provide a web-based interface, and most services are also web-based,
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implementing SOAP or REST interfaces. Therefore SSL/TLS is employed for secure
communications with users as well as among themselves.
& INDECT Databases—although stored deep inside the LEA data center, they should
communicate in a secure way with IDECT application servers and being encrypted, for
by instance using the novel INDECT Block Cipher (IBC) presented later.
& Virtual Private Network (VPN)—protect the communications with external LEA users
and devices. Only encrypted traffic is allowed to go through the LEA Data Center
firewalls, which block all external traffic by default and should feature additional
security mechanisms such as Intrusion detection Systems (IDS).
& Smart Cards—storing users’ certificates are issued by the INDECT PKI and used for
access control by the central INDECT web portal, as well as encrypting and signing e-
mails and documents.
The following sections study in more detail the different security technologies and
protocols employed inside this integrated architecture.
It is worth noticing that, in order to guarantee the robustness of the security architecture and a
wide support by applications, standard security protocols like TLS/SSL or IPSec have been
preferred to custom ones. Nonetheless the INDECT security architecture also includes novel
mechanisms such as the new INDECT Block Cipher (IBC) that may be employed to encrypt
TLS/SSL sessions and VPN tunnels.
3 INDECT public key infrastructure
One of the main characteristics of the INDECT project is that it is composed by multiple
heterogeneous systems that exchange sensitive information among them. Therefore it is necessary
Fig. 1 INDECT security architecture
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to fulfill all requirements for information security: Access Control, Authentication, Non-
Reputation, Data Confidentiality, Communication Security, Data Integrity, Availability and Pri-
vacy [1]. One of the main elements of the security infrastructures being deployed to provide these
security properties is the INDECT Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This PKI is the base for
creating a heterogeneous and secure environment, based on X.509 certificates, public keys and
asymmetric cryptographic. The INDECT PKI architecture has a hierarchical, two-level structure:
& Level I—Only the Root Certification Authority (Root CA) operates at this level. This
CA is always offline to prevent attacks to the root key of the INDECT PKI.
& Level II—There are two CAs at this level: one for issuing certificates to users (Users’ CA),
and other CA for issuing certificates to devices (Devices CA). A trusted connection is
established between these two CAs. Thus, the Root CA only issues certificates to these two
CAs (Users and Devices CAs).
Figure 2 shows the different levels of the INDECT PKI and the relationship between the
different CAs.
The Users CA manages (create, issue, revoke etc.) all the certificates related to INDECT
users. Users may employ these certificates to log into the INDECT web portals, sign
documents or encrypt connections and e-mails. These X.509 certificates are securely stored
in smart-cards as described in the next section.
The Devices CA manages all aspects of certificates issued to devices (PCs, PDAs,
CCTVs, etc.). Each X.509 certificate is assigned to a specific device, thus each device can
be uniquely identified and managed based on its certificate. Devices’ certificates are used for
creating secure communication channels (e.g. TLS/SSL or SSH), for signing data streams
and exchanging documents, and for authentication to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.
Table 1 shows the appropriate key sizes for the proposed CA’s and the certificates they issue.
Fig. 2 Sample presentation of PKI infrastructure
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In order to test the feasibility of the proposed INDECT PKI, a testbed first based on
OpenCA [8] and EJBCA [3] has been deployed1. A sample user certificate issued by this
PKI is shown below:
1 Initially we planned to employ OpenCA for the proposed INDECT Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
However we stopped using OpenCA because of the key length limitations (up to 4096 bits). It is possible
to issue keys with length up to 8192 bits by using EJBCA which covers INDECT CA requirements.
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Currently the work is focused on creating a fully functional infrastructure based on
EJBCA, implementing specific extensions for X.509 certificates, and finally to employ the
certificates issued by the PKI in other INDECT systems and in the remaining security
infrastructures.
4 Federated identity based on certificates and smartcards
In a Federated Identity scenario, different Service Providers (SPs) delegate the identity
management of these users to a centralized entity referred as Identity Provider (IdP) within
a controlled environment called Circle of Trust (CoT). This concept has been the starting
point for the user management solution implemented for the INDECT project. The system
formed by (at least) one IdP and (at least) one SP is called a Federation, and it is
characterized by having a trust relationship among its members, simplifying data commu-
nication and validation of the user in a secure way.
Usually Federated Identity solutions are focused on managing and protecting end
user’s information employed by different services [13]. However the main emphasis of
INDECT security framework must be on providing a controlled and secure access to the
different INDECT services. To maximize the compliance of these requirements so as to
meet this scenario, the Federated Identity paradigm has been extrapolated to a secure
model that also relays on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for two-factor authentication.
Within INDECT, the IdP role is played by the INDECT web portal, although part of the
user management is also performed by the PKI that issues INDECT certificates. This way
they are able to guarantee the identities of all INDECT elements: users, devices and servers,
pointing out their unique identifier and attributes as well as managing their validity. The CA
is then a trustworthy element in which all other INDECT elements have to trust in. Based on
certificates, any exchange is carried out between authenticated and trustworthy elements
through secure channels as explained in next section.
The certificate generation, and therefore the PKI, is linked to the user registration process.
When a user is registered into the system, the User CA creates the corresponding certificate,
including part of the information provided in the registration process. The information stored
in the certificate should be relevant for the user management process and must be not
updated frequently (i.e. the user identifier).
This X.509 certificate enables checking the identity of the user. When a user accesses any
INDECT systems through the INDECT Portal, its certificate is required by means of
TLS/SSL. The authentication solution is able to check the validity of the certification with
the corresponding CA and process its data, informing the INDECT Service Provider about
the users’ identity and attributes (i.e. role).
Table 1 Suggested size of the
private RSA keys CA role Key length
Root CA 8192 bits
User CA 4096 bits
Device CA 4096 bits
User certificate 2048 bits
Device certificate 1024 bits
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The access control solution is then composed by four main elements:
& INDECT Security Local Tools, which allow to generate, a key pair (private and public)
as the previous step to the generation of a certificate, and on the other hand, the
certificate container (PKCS#12), necessary to load the certificate in a smart card or in
the browser.
& INDECT PKI Certification Authority, which issues the X509 users’, service providers’
and access devices’ certificates and manages their validity. The certificates, through their
extensions, contain the information that has been considered relevant for the access
control process, such as the security clearance of the user.
& A Certification Holder, is where the certificates are stored, like a Smart Card.
& Authentication Filter Libraries, that, once integrated in the INDECT application servers
(Service Providers), will allow INDECT applications to handle the user authentication
information, such as validating the certificate and recovering any certificate information,
like user’s identity or any other extension.
This design also supports legacy LEA applications employed by users without a certif-
icate. In this case, a login and password will be required to access these low-security
applications. These user credentials are stored in the LDAP User Directory to ease its
management. Moreover, depending on the levels associated to the users’ attributes, access
to high-security applications may require both a valid certificate and an additional password,
thus enabling multi-factor authentication.
Based on the user’s attributes (contained in the certificate and in the LDAP repository) the
general users’ rights are built. According to this information, the user will access the INDECT
Portal dashboard through which the authorized INDECT services will be accessible.
5 Communications security
A major challenge is how to protect in a secure manner the diverse set of applications and
systems being developed by the INDECT project without designing a specific security
mechanism for each system. The main design insight is that most networked2 INDECT
applications have got either a web interface or are based on web services, although other
systems employ a completely different set of protocols and only have in common the fact
that they run on top of the Internet Protocol (IP).
Therefore we should start studying standard security mechanism for these two different
sets of applications. On the one hand, the security of INDECT web-based applications and
web services is based on the so called “Secure HTTP” (HTTPS). On the other hand,
applications based on protocols different to HTTP or remote systems running outside the
security of the Data Center protect their communications by means of Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs).
5.1 Virtual private networks (VPNs)
One of the main components of the secure communication infrastructure within INDECTsystem
is a Virtual Private Network (VPN) framework that will enable the secure communication among
2 The INDECT project is also developing standalone, non-networked applications. We won’t consider it
security here, since its usage is confined to particular systems and the information that can be disclosed by a
security breach is limited to the local data of the application.
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multiple remote nodes and servers interconnected over public networks. Nowadays virtual
private networks are usually based on two different technologies: IPSec and SSL.
For the implementation of VPN infrastructures in the INDECT system, only open-source
solutions will be used due to its flexibility and proven robustness. In particular, the StrongSwan
software package seems to be a convenient open-source IPSec VPN solution. StrongSwan is
intended primarily for devices using Linux, although it is fully compatible with other standard
IPSec VPN implementations, and thus can be used in networks with mixed equipment.
As an open-source SSL VPN solution, the best option appears to be the OpenVPN
software package. OpenVPN can be installed in computers with major operating systems,
and it is a very flexible and scalable VPN package. For example, it works nicely with
Network Address Translators (NAT) in contrast to IPSec VPNs. On the other hand, it has
compatibility problems with VPN solutions from other vendors.
Both VPN packages, StrongSwan and OpenVPN, support PKI and authentication based
on X.509 certificates. Each VPN client obtains a certificate from a certification authority,
which is subsequently used to authenticate the client when a secure tunnel has to be created
between the client and the VPN gateway. To support Authentication, Authorization and
Auditing (AAA) services, an additional LDAP/RADIUS server can be employed, which
must be located inside the private network.
Within the INDECT system, users will employ mainly OpenVPN to securely communi-
cate between their terminals (desktop, laptop, PDA, smart phone, etc.) and servers located in
the Police headquarters. The INDECT Devices CAwill authenticate the individual terminals.
5.2 Security and mutual authentication of INDECT web applications
The secure version of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) employed by web applica-
tions is commonly known as “HTTPS” since this is the protocol name that appears at the
beginning of the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of secure web sites. However “HTTPS”
is not a new protocol itself, but specifies that HTTP protocol runs on top of a secure session
protocol. This secure protocol is called TLS/SSL, and it is the foundation of the common
security mechanism of web-based INDECT applications.
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) [2] and its predecessor, and probably more popular,
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [4], are client–server protocols that provide communications
security on top of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). Although SSL was originally
designed for the web, they are application-agnostic, meaning that any application protocol
running on top of TCP may run on top of TLS/SSL. It is an advanced security protocol
featuring symmetric-cryptography encryption, asymmetric-cryptography key exchange,
end-point authentication based on X.509 certificates, and integrity protection by means of
message authentication codes. Moreover, TLS/SSL is an extensible protocol since peers are
able to negotiate which version of the protocol and what cipher suite (e.g. TLS_RSA_WI-
TH_INDECT_320_CBC_SHA) will be used during the communication session. However it
is worth noting that TLS/SSL does not provide digital signature or non-repudiation services,
thus these security mechanisms must be implemented by the applications that require it.
Usually in a web TLS/SSL session only the server is authenticated, that is, it is the web
server who send its X.509 certificate to the client. After validating the certificate (i.e.
checking server’s name, the expiration date, the whole certificate chain, the revocation list,
etc.) the client encrypts the session key exchange message with the public key of the
certificate, thus the communication can only progress if the server has the private key. This
way, web browsers can check that they are actually communicating with the intended web
server (e.g. the original bank website instead of a phising clone), thwarting all kinds of man-
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in-the-middle attacks. However INDECTweb applications will also authenticate the client of
the TLS/SSL session by means of the X.509 certificate stored in the Smart Card of the user.
Figure 3 details the setup of a TLS/SSL session with mutual authentication.
The advantage of using TLS/SSL for INDECT web applications is that it is already
implemented by all major web browsers and web servers, and it is enforced even before the
application is called. Therefore, when TLS/SSL is properly configured in the server, the
application is certain that the client has been authenticated by means of the X.509 certificate
stored in a pin-protected Smart Card. Thus, it provides from the start a two-factor authen-
tication service based on a “something you have” and/or “something you know” credentials.
From a cryptographic point of view, and after several revisions, TLS version 1.2 is
considered a secure protocol, although many attacks have been proposed against practical
details of its implementation. Recently the security breaches of some trusted Certificate
Authorities, including the issue of fraudulent server certificates, have called into question the
security of PKI, and thus the TLS/SSL authentication security. However, we argue that these
attacks do not pose a threat to the use of TLS/SSL by INDECT systems, since secure
terminals do not trust other Certification Authorities (CAs) than INDECT’s one. Moreover
INDECT web servers do only request and accept client certificates issued by the INDECT
Users’ CA. Therefore, even if the certificate of an INDECT device (e.g. a node station) is
compromised, it cannot be employed neither to supplant an application server, nor a user.
Fig. 3 TLS/SSL secure session setup with mutual authentication [12]
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6 INDECT block cipher’s basics
One of the research activities performed by INDECT project refers to modern cryptographic
techniques. This includes developing new algorithms and protocols which ensure high-level
of data confidentiality. New algorithms are evaluated by means of proper simulators and
tested to check the resistance on several attacks.
The INDECT Block Cipher (IBC) [7], is a novel algorithm to encrypt data, that meets the
stringent confidentiality requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies. The cipher transforms
a message in order to make it unreadable to anyone except some proper entities (i.e., the
sender and recipient). It is a symmetric block cipher, so both encryption and decryption
processes transform a message by means of the same key (secret key).
The proposed block cipher is based on two functions: substitution matrix (S-Box) and
permutation. These operations are used in each round of the cipher. During each single
round, the 256-bit block of plaintext/ciphertext is divided into 64 sub-blocks, 8-bit each. In
the next step each sub-block is passed to the substitution box as the input value. Output
values are concatenated into one 256-bit block (the merging method is adequate to the
previous division schema). The last step is the use of a permutation function (based on S-
Box) on the 256-bit block of data. The innovation of this cipher is based on the idea of “basic
functions” and its linear combinations. This concept, allows us to modify the structure of
cipher by means of a key and use huge number of non-linear S-boxes. Below, only the major
features of IBC cipher are presented:
& A substitution-permutation structure
& The cipher architecture depends on the key
& Uses a huge number of non-linear S-boxes (about 5,35*1018)
& Block size: 256 bit
& Key lengths: 128, 192, 320, 576 bit
& Number of rounds: 8, 10, 12, 14
The IBC algorithm was initially tested by means of a new simulator. The simulator
checks the main security features of the cipher, which decide the strength of cryptographic
algorithm. All simulations confirmed that IBC ensures the high-level of data confidentiality.
The following features were tested:
& Balancing,
& Non-linearity,
& Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC),
& Completeness,
& Diffusion order, and
& Structure of XOR table.
The functionality of the new cipher was later verified by means of software and
hardware implementations [6]. The C++ programming language was chosen for the
software implementation of the algorithm itself, whereas the Graphical User Interface
(GUI) was built by means of the C++/CLI language under the .NET platform. The visual
interface of the IBC application showing an example of the encryption process is presented
in Fig. 4. Additionally, the functionality of the IBC cipher was implemented in a Xilinx
Spartan FPGA.
The next step towards the practical usage of IBC has been its integration with popular
security libraries such as OpenSSL and OpenVPN. This integration greatly simplifies using
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the developed algorithms in practice. By means of such integration in the OpenSSL library,
the IBC cipher can be used to secure different INDECT subsystems as well as other
applications outside the project.
The integration consisted of two steps: the implementation of the new cipher algorithm in
the libcrypto library and the modification of the OpenSSL code to make the new cipher
fully available in all OpenSSL utilities and in SSL/TLS connections. During the integration
of the IBC cipher within the OpenSSL environment, many crucial files of the OpenSSL
library were modified (i.e.: apps/progs.h, apps/speed.c, different files from
crypto/evp and crypto/objects directories). Also, some new files which contain
definition of IBC’s functions and the code performing actual encryption and decryption were
added.
The most important feature of integrating the IBC cipher in OpenSSL was to easy use
IBC in existing applications (just by replacing the existing shared library files with the
modified ones). This is possible when the binary compatibility is ensured between the
original and modified libraries. By being aware of this requirement, now it is possible to
deploy IBC on existing systems without changing the code of applications using OpenSSL
or even without recompiling. The binary compatibility has been tested by the ABI compli-
ance checker (an open source tool available for Linux operating systems).
6.1 OpenSSL implementation and testing results
In particular the INDECT Block Cipher, has been implemented into the OpenSSL 0.9.8v
software package. OpenSSL Project [9] is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
commercial-grade, full-featured and open source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols as well as a full-strength
general purpose cryptography library. The core library of OpenSSL is written in the C
programming language and implements the basic cryptographic functions and provides
various utility functions. OpenSSL can be used in many operating systems—Solaris, Linux,
MAC OS X, open source BSD, OpenVMS, and Microsoft Windows.
Fig. 4 The INDECT Block Cipher (IBC) application with an example of the encryption process
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The modified OpenSSL 0.9.8v supports the following IBC cipher modes—INDECT-128-
CBC, INDECT-128-ECB, INDECT-192-CBC, INDECT-192-ECB, INDECT-320-CBC, and
INDECT-320-ECB, supporting 128, 192 and 320 bit long keys with Cipher-Block Chaining
(CBC) and Electronic Codebook (ECB) modes of operation.
To analyze the performance of OpenSSL cryptographic operations, a benchmark was
performed using the openssl speed command. This test was carried out by a plain desktop
computer with Ubuntu 12.04 LTS operating system and Intel Celeron processor running at
2.8 GHz. The measured results can be seen in Table 2. For comparison, it contains values for
six variations of IBC cipher (modes and key length), six variations of AES cipher, two IDEA
cipher’s mode of operation and two CAST cipher’s mode of operation. All values in the table
are measured in kilobytes per second processed when encrypting a block of data. The size of
the data block is listed in column headers.
Obviously, the measurements show that the performance of the new IBC cipher is
significantly worse than the other more mature ciphers. This is due to fact that the IBC
code is not yet implemented optimally, especially when compared with the AES cipher that
is the most popular symmetric cipher nowadays and subject of continuous optimizations in
the past years. Although IBC already has a reasonable performance for the communication
needs of current applications (e.g. 25 Mbps), improving the performance of the IBC cipher is
the next goal of our research in this area.
Besides these raw cipher benchmarks, the modified OpenSSL library has also been tested
to check that IBC is also supported in TLS/SSL sessions. Each IBC cipher suite has been
assigned an identifier in the 0x00FFxx range (e.g. DHE-RSA-INDECT320-SHA is
encoded as 0x00FF88) to be negotiated in SSL sessions. Actually IBC with a 320 bits
key is usually selected by default as the cipher to encrypt TLS/SSL sessions because
OpenSSL prioritizes longer keys. However, when one of the peers does not support IBC,
Table 2 Results of cipher performance benchmark (in kilobytes per second)
Cipher Block size
16 bytes
Block size
64 bytes
Block size
256 bytes
Block size
1024 bytes
Block size
8192 bytes
INDECT-128-CBC 4504 4541 4611 4605 4618
INDECT-128-ECB 4510 4536 4561 4575 4544
INDECT-192-CBC 3635 3654 3654 3663 3674
INDECT-192-ECB 3644 3683 3698 3672 3697
INDECT-320-CBC 3084 3097 3113 3113 3102
INDECT-320-ECB 3092 3118 3136 3124 3128
AES-128-CBC 45844 84438 109087 118111 117976
AES-128-ECB 95633 103068 106600 105506 105274
AES-192-CBC 42558 74902 93568 100929 100518
AES-192-ECB 83758 89517 92369 92161 91335
AES-256-CBC 39406 66725 82262 87411 88030
AES-256-ECB 73849 78735 80207 80800 80694
IDEA-CBC 31688 34899 36428 36279 37147
IDEA-ECB 32754 35358 35659 35449 35847
CAST5-CBC 39042 44645 46394 46419 47463
CAST5-ECB 37203 38195 38352 39078 39058
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a standard cipher like AES256 is selected instead, therefore being fully compatible with
other TLS/SSL implementations.
Regarding to the use of IBC for protecting VPN tunnels, OpenVPN [10] uses OpenSSL
to perform all cryptographic operations, therefore it should be also possible to protect the
INDECT VPN infrastructure with IBC, although this has not been tested yet. The perfor-
mance of IBC-enabled OpenVPN clients and servers would mainly depend on the perfor-
mance of encryption of the outgoing traffic and decryption of the incoming traffic. Therefore
future improvements of IBC cryptographic performance would be especially important for
OpenVPN servers that handle a large number of VPN tunnels.
7 Summary and final thoughts
A security architecture based on PKI functionality and Federated Identity is one of the most
preferred and reliable solutions for data protection [14]. By building such a security infrastruc-
ture, the INDECT project sets ways of working with state-of-the-art security technologies.
A Federated Identity framework both simplifies user management and enhances its
security. The INDECT Portal acts as the Identity Provider (IdP) that INDECT applications
and Service Providers (SPs) employ to authenticate users employing multi-modal authenti-
cation, based on X.509 certificates stored in Smart Cards. Moreover, the separation of
INDECT PKI in two hierarchical levels allows both, securing the main PKI element—the
ROOT CA—and to manage and operate systems and users in different ways. For instance
defining two CAs for users and devices enables the possibility of identifying each device in
the systems and to manage each user individually. This type of PKI organization gives us the
possibility to secure the data in different ways on different points of the creating, transmit-
ting, editing and storing process.
Communication security is basic a tool for creating a secure distributed environment.
Therefore VPNs, also based on X.509 certificates, have been selected for the INDECT
security architecture. In this case key management and key negotiation do not require an
additional secure channel. This way of creating a secure communication environment
simplifies the cryptography key infrastructure and minimizes the number of secret keys.
Furthermore, the TLS/SSL protocol is the foundation for the security of web-based INDECT
applications and services. It enables communications security, including encryption, mes-
sage integrity and mutual authentication between clients and servers. However TLS/SSL just
provides a base security layer, INDECT web applications may implement further security
mechanisms such as password-based authentication, or digital signatures for non-repudiation
services.
Nowadays cryptography is the only way to guarantee the confidentiality of data. The
development of new protocols and algorithms based on symmetric ciphers like the INDECT
Block Cipher (IBC) gives users the possibility to use, exchange and store data in secure way.
Thanks to its integration in the popular OpenSSL library, newly developed tools, protocols
and applications may easily employ the new IBC algorithm to protect sensitive information
when communicating with other entities, especially once the IBC implementation is opti-
mized for performance.
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